Exh far out dude

To start with, we have to understand what we imply by the term far-right. Personally, I dislike this term as it is conceptually confusing. A quite moderate centre-right party can be considered far-right if there are no other parties further to its right.

 

When we refer to so-called far-right parties, we aren't really thinking of a spatial position so much as an ideological position. Thus the label far-right should be dispensed with in favour of an alternative. The more popular labels in the literature tend to focus on the extreme, radical, or populist right.

What do these terms mean? Well, drawing on the literature, we can suggest that extreme right parties are those that explicitly oppose democracy and favour some authoritarian political structure instead. When thinking of the extreme right, we are really thinking of fascists and Nazis. The radical right by contrast, expresses support for the institutions of democracy but tends to be rather cooler on many of the substantive elements of democracy. I.e. these parties tend to undermine the legitimacy of modern liberal democracies through their eschewing of core democratic principles, such as pluralism or fundamental human equality. Finally, populism describes what is an ideologically-driven world view. In essence, the political sphere is understood through a Manichean lens, that is, there are the evil and corrupt elites on the one hand and the pure, downtrodden, people on the other. Political life and wider society is understood by reference to these two opposing poles, with the populist uniquely defending the rights of the 'common man', 'ordinary person', etc. Given that the essence of populism is anti-pluralist, we can posit that actually populists that inhibit the right-wing of politics are essentially radical right.

This distinction between extreme and radical is important because the former has tended to do quite poorly in the post-war period - as one might expect - while the latter has tended to do quite well. Although it should be noted that many esteemed scholars of the extreme/radical right do reject this distinction. Dr Elisabeth Carter and Dr Piero Ignazi spring to mind here. For them, the fact that radical right parties undermine the legitimacy of democracy is sufficient to make them anti-democratic and therefore extreme right (see Ignazi 2003, Carter 2005, Carter 2018 for an overview of this perspective; which I haven't done justice here).

So why have the radical right done so well? There are a number of empirically-backed theories but there are a few that I think go along way in explaining what has happened.

Firstly, we must consider societal changes. The traditional cleavages that dominated various European countries have broken down, while post-materialist values have gained credence. We have seen the liberalisation of society, increasing rights for minority groups, an increase in racial and cultural diversity, an enhancement of individual liberty, the declining importance of religion, the near destruction of traditional communities, the perceived erosion of traditional social bonds, and a perceived collapse of traditional moral standards and sexual mores. This has produced a silent counter-revolution (see Ignazi) whose adherents want a return to an ordered, hierarchical, homogenous, traditionalist, safe society. As established parties have become more liberal and accepting of the permissive society, so the radical right have sought to exploit these silent counter revolutionaries, through appeals to traditional values and moral positions, social provision, and the like.

Secondly, and relatedly, we must consider the role of immigration and diversification of society both in terms of race and culture. Some previous research has shown a correlation between rates of immigration and voting for the radical right. Not only does immigration potentially encourage radical right voting, but the perceived refusal or failure of established parties to 'get to grips' with immigration encourages radical right support, and even reduces trust in traditional political institutions. Indeed, we have seen a widespread decline in trust in political institutions, including democracy itself, across a number of European countries.

Thirdly, a product of immigration and diversity is a decline in social trust. Research suggests that as a society becomes more diverse, traditional bonds weaken, and social trust between communities weakens as well. This might encourage a certain animosity between communities that might encourage 'native' populations to vote for radical right parties who promise to restore the nation, to limit immigration, to force integration, and who oppose the 'Islamification of Europe', etc.

Fourthly, established political parties have become increasingly distant and unresponsive to the demands of voters. Thus voters abandon established parties in favour of alternative parties who are willing to reflect their interests in wants. In some countries this is the radical right (e.g. Italy) while in others this is the radical left (e.g. Greece). Relatedly, as established political parties have tended towards the centre, space has been made available for the radical right to grow. Traditionally, in a number of Western European countries, centre-right parties have held the radical right at bay by focusing on issues of culture and migration. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, centre-right parties adopted a more liberal-orientation, and thus provided ample opportunities for the radical right to assert themselves. Research by Bonnie Meguid suggests that if established parties accommodate the issues of the radical right and compete on that territory, then the established parties will be successful in reducing radical right vote share. Indeed, this forms a part of my own research.

Finally, we must look to these radical parties themselves. They have undergone a significant shift in their messaging and programmatic profiles. They have deliberately moderated parts of their profile in order to appeal to greater numbers of people. They have incorporated a range of 'niche' issues so as to broaden their electorate, and have sought to eradicate historical baggage that prevented greater success. A prime example of this is the National Front in France under Marine le Pen. She has deliberately engaged in a process of detoxification or de-radicalisation, such that even minority groups are voting FN. The adoption of relatively young, charismatic leaders, with great messaging also helps.